Choose the Failure
Why a CEO refused to count the savings from safer work, even when rising profits seemed to prove him right.

The investors expected a new CEO to talk about margins and markets. Paul O'Neill talked about people getting hurt.
In Charles Duhigg's account, the room was a Manhattan hotel ballroom in October 1987. Wall Street investors and analysts had come to hear Alcoa's new chief.
"I want to talk to you about worker safety," O'Neill began. Then: "I intend to go for zero injuries."
Someone asked about inventories in the aerospace division. O'Neill replied, "I'm not certain you heard me." To understand how Alcoa was doing, he said, they should look at its safety figures.
One investor went to a pay phone and told his 20 largest clients to sell. Duhigg reports that the investor thought the board had hired a "crazy hippie."
The investor heard a man avoiding the business. O'Neill had told the room to judge Alcoa by its safety figures.
Why safety?
The answer that fits
The speech in the Manhattan ballroom becomes a parable: safety pays.
In that telling, O'Neill saw a connection the investors missed. Care for the people doing the work, and the business improves. Safety was how he would get there.
The numbers make that answer hard to resist. According to Alcoa, the lost-workday rate fell from 1.86 to about 0.2 per 100 workers over his tenure. Duhigg reports record profits within a year of the speech.
Fortune added a larger measure. Profits for 1988 and 1989 together exceeded twice the total for the previous eight years.
For anyone whose quiet work goes unnoticed, that is an appealing answer. Prevention leaves little to show when it works. The money gives it a result the whole room can recognize.
It also gives the investor's mistake a satisfying ending. He thought safety distracted from business. The figures seem to show that safety was the business.
The answer fits.
What the figures leave open
O'Neill would not let his own finance staff make that calculation. In his 2001 account, reported by ISHN, he said he had threatened to fire anyone who tried to calculate the savings from safety. He treated safety as a human value, not an expense that needed a return.
Nor had he arrived to rescue an unusually dangerous company. Fortune reported that Alcoa already had the industry's best safety record. Injuries were falling by nearly half every five years. Against that record, he set the goal of zero.
The profits also had more around them than the safety program. Fortune placed the 1988 and 1989 results in one of the industry's strongest booms. Alcoa's 2000 annual report recorded another earnings high in a year that included two large acquisitions, Reynolds and Cordant.
The profits also had more around them than the safety program.

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Safety improved. Profits rose. Both belong in the record, but their movement together does not tell us how much one caused the other.
The savings might have been real. O'Neill refused to make them the reason.
What zero required
On his first day, O'Neill told the safety director that zero was the only goal he would accept. O'Neill said nobody could argue against the wish for an injury-free workplace, so he could hold to that goal while people argued over the method.
He told Fortune: "You can't get safety unless you really understand your processes."
Months into his tenure, a young plant worker stepped over a barrier when a machine jammed. He had been in the job only a few weeks. Two supervisors watched, and he was killed.
He left a pregnant wife.
Duhigg reports that O'Neill brought the plant's executives together 14 hours later. They listed dozens of errors that had contributed to the death.
There was no sensor to stop the machine. The training had never told the worker he would not be blamed for a breakdown. The supervisors had seen him cross the barrier and had not stopped him.
"We killed this man," O'Neill said, in Duhigg's account.
Fortune noted that shortcuts could point to an inefficient process or an inadequate tool. Understanding why someone took one could expose work that needed changing.
Fortune described specially trained workers watching a fellow worker at his station for up to an hour, then discussing deviations from procedures together. Before bosses saw the data and the observer's comments, names were removed to keep the conversation unthreatening.
Zero made each injury a question about the work.
Who gets the call
That question needed a route out of the plant.
In his 2001 account, O'Neill said the 26 business-unit vice presidents had to call him personally about any lost-workday case. In his 2013 account, injuries and incidents were posted within 24 hours. Those posts included names, causes and corrective actions.
These were different rules. One brought the failure to the top. The other made what happened, and what would change, visible across the company.
Safety gave him an unusual advantage. Nobody had to defend an injury. A marketing or analytics team has no equally clear number, and a missed brief is not a death.
I would not carry the number across. I would start with the failure the room could agree it should not accept.
In my own work, marketing and sales read the same records and reached opposite verdicts. Marketing saw qualified leads. Sales saw noise. The word had crossed the handoff without a shared test for whether the record showed just demand or evidence that a buyer was ready to buy.
In my own work, marketing and sales read the same records and reached opposite verdicts.

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Could both teams agree that letting it travel unnoticed was unacceptable? Could each instance reach someone able to change the cause within a day?
Being reachable mattered too. O'Neill gave hourly workers his home number. A worker at the Tennessee plant called about a broken conveyor and 600-pound ingots. Around four in the morning, the plant manager called O'Neill to say the conveyor was fixed.
The repair did more than settle that problem. Word spread. How the first call was answered helped decide whether anyone would call again.
The room had heard "zero injuries." O'Neill still had to hear about each injury.
I keep notes on which failures a team refuses to accept and how fast each one reaches someone who can help.